

Social Rule

A Study of the Will to Power

UNIV. OF
CALIFORNIA

By

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Social Rule

THE SATISFACTION FROM THE SOCIAL CATEGORIES

IN any study of the relations between personality and social classification the queries arise why the social categories are alike so compulsive to the conservative-minded and so precious, why they are given such unfailing loyalty, why such unquestioning devotion? To offset the miseries they allow of or further, the tragedies they prepare, what satisfaction do they offer? Do they serve only as measures against change, as safeguards to habit,—this is the answer I once suggested,¹—raising barriers between those most apt to upset one another's ways, the inevitably unlike, the unlike in sex, in age, in economic or cultural class?

¹ Parsons, Elsie Clews, *Social Freedom*, p. 104, New York, 1915.

The social categories are no doubt a safeguard against the innovations personality untrammelled would be up to, and this protection is by no means a trifling social function; but the categories, it now seems to me, perform a positive as well as a negative service; they are an unparalleled means of gratifying the will to power¹ as it expresses itself in social relations. The classified individual may be held in subjection in ways the unclassified escapes. "Being women, eat crumbs!" a Chuk-chee may exclaim. A woman who dares talk back hears, "Since you are a woman, be silent!"² Besides, a would-be woman rebel is kept in her place the more easily if her rebellion mean "unsexing" herself, for both sexes will be arrayed against her.³ Similarly a refractory junior will

¹ Since I shall make considerable use of this phrase, I would suggest that, like any other popular catch-word, it is harmless as long as it is recognised as a mere verbal convenience; but that it is a constraint upon thought when sociological authority is imputed to it. I therefore beg the reader to take it always in this discussion as a descriptive and not as an explanatory term. It is descriptive of that "general inclination of all mankind" which Hobbes calls "a perpetual desire of power after power that ceaseth only in death."

² Bogoras, W., *Mem. Amer. Mus. Nat. Hist.*, VII., Pt. II., 547, 548. Leiden and New York, 1907.

³ Margaret Fuller once described very neatly the sometime value of sex classification to Anglo-Saxon husbands. "It has

not only be told that as a junior he should be seen and not heard, but, in recognition of the principle of seniority, he will find all his elders standing together against him. The poor man, the wage-earner, the slave, the illiterate, the commoner will have against him in any conflict with one of superior station all of the "upper" classes. The lawless, once pronounced a criminal, will have against him all the law-abiding.¹ Once the abnormal is labelled he is at the mercy of the normal. The more fixed the traits and functions of a ghost or god, the more assured and classified his supernaturalism, the more thoroughly is he in hand,

been inculcated on women, for centuries, that men have not only stronger passions than they, but of a sort that it would be shameful for them to share or even understand; that, therefore, they must 'confide in their husbands,' that is, submit implicitly to their will. . . . Accordingly, a great part of women look upon men as a kind of wild beasts, but 'suppose they are all alike.'" (*Woman in the Nineteenth Century*, pp. 150-1. Boston, Cleveland, New York, 1855.)

¹ The anti-national, I might add, or even the critic of national traits or trends will have against him all the patriotic. In this study I have not included an analysis of nationalism, but it deserves consideration in its aspect as a means of social rule. "I could not have controlled that convention," the president of a nationalist association said to me the other day, "had I not appealed from time to time to the national feeling. 'You say this' or 'you act thus,' I would exclaim, 'and you a Serb!'" "And you a Serb!" "And you a German!" "And you an

the more harmless or the more useful is he to his descendants or worshippers. A tutelary spirit, whether ghost or god, is expected to mind his business. He may not be neglectful, he may not be meddling or obtrusive. Once in Fiji Hocart tells us he was present with some natives who had met together in a house where the ghosts were to come to fetch away a dead man. One of the ghosts gave news through the medium that in ghostland he had just bought a boat. His living son, uninterested in this posthumous business transaction, bade his father begone. "I am a man, you, a ghost," said he; "I don't like you, I don't want to speak to you, go away."¹

The preëminent function of social classification appears therefore to be social rule. In institutions

American!"—it is a very handy whip—in holding a convention, in getting votes, in going to war. The other day the President of the United States gave a fairly adequate account of the usefulness of the classified American: "If a man describes himself to me now in any other terms than those terms [Americanism], *I am not sure of him*; and I love the fellows that come into my office sometimes and say: 'Mr. President, I am an American.' Their hearts are right, their instinct true, they are going in the right direction and *will take the right leadership* if they believe that the leader is also a man who thinks first of America." (The *New York Times*, May 17, 1916.)

¹ Hocart, A. M., in *Folk-Lore*, XXVI. (1915), 132-3.

where subjection is most desired, institutions like the Catholic Church or like a modern army, classification is most positive and most patent. Classification is nine-tenths of subjection. Indeed to rule over another successfully you have only to see to it that he keeps his place—his place as a male, her place as a female, his or her place as a junior, as a subject or servant or social “inferior” of any kind, as an outcast or exile, a ghost or a god. Even to rule over yourself you must keep your feelings balanced, your thoughts from vagrancy.

Self-control is a means to controlling other people. So is self-classification. The feeling of having our class back of us gives us self-assurance. When we gratify our gregarious impulse, we enhance our sense of power. Similarly, by declassifying or demoting others or by suspending their regular classification, so to speak, we get a pleasurable sense of our own power. Such enhancement of the sense of power is part of the psychological explanation of the license of Saturnalia or Cronia, of women’s days,[†] of the

[†]Many simple communities celebrate a day on which men and women exchange rôles. When New York was New Amsterdam such a day was kept. On *Vrouwen Dag* any girl could lash any

First of April. Slave owners, men, the Elders, all know that such suspensions of order or such institutional outbreaks but strengthen their rule. For somewhat the same reason employers of labour and navy and army officers are apt to be tolerant of week-end debauchery or of the sporadic sprees of river jack or sailor or soldier. Even the periodic returns the living allow the dead—the *anthesteria*, the all souls' nights—strengthen rather than weaken that sense of domination over the dead without which life to many would be intolerably fearful.

Demotion, putting into a lower class, is not only gratifying, it is a very common means of controlling a subject class. Subjugated men, for example, or men open to insult are sometimes classed as women. If the relatives of a Thompson River Indian killed by a strange tribe do not undertake an expedition of reprisal they are called women.¹ To so disgrace a Pulayan casteman that his fellows refuse him their society he is thrashed with the

boy she met with the cord whip she was that day entitled to carry. (Boese, J., *Public Education in the City of New York*, p. 18 n.)

¹ Teit, J., *Mem. Amer. Mus. Nat. Hist.*, II., 290, New York, 1900.

leafy garment worn by women.¹ Wishing to degrade the Delawares for violating a treaty, the Iroquois actually put skirts on them, "making women" of them,² as an Iroquois chief was once heard to jeer. The taunt of being only a girl is to us also fairly familiar.

Women may be taunted with being animals. When a South Slav woman asserts her superiority, to spite her, a man may declare that she is not after all a rib from Adam, for did not a dog run off with the rib God had taken out for her creation? Although God chased the dog, he did not recover the rib; he was able to grab from the dog only his tail, and it was out of this tail God had to make woman.³ Analogously, adults may be called children, mere children; and a little boy or girl, "only a baby." Once when a native Congo trader wanted to snub the Rev. R. E. Dennett he called him, not an unfrocked priest, but merely "a small boy."⁴

¹ Thurston, E., *Ethnographic Notes in Southern India*, p. 453. Madras, 1906.

² Morgan, L. H., *The League of the Iroquois*, I., 329. New York, 1901.

³ *Anthropophyteia*, I. (1904), 10-11.

⁴ *Nigerian Studies*, p. 192. London, 1910.

The will to power and more particularly the will to power over other people is a more general character than we are quite aware of. There is an enormous amount of energy put to controlling or regulating human creatures, to keeping them in their place, to keeping them in order. In fact without exaggeration one may say that the bulk of our surplus energy, energy beyond that applied to sustaining life, expresses itself in ruling others.

A considerable part of energy spent on ruling or on social control goes into justifying the given means of rule or control; but with the resultant justifications we are not in this discussion concerned. We are not engaged in passing ethical judgment. Hence we can afford to disregard, as a rule, the rationalising or moralising almost every social act or belief is subject to. By this disregard we would not minimise the importance of the desire to moralise or rationalise. It is a highly significant social phenomenon, but, except as it is in itself expressive of the will to power, it is not pertinent to our analysis.

Our discussion will be a direct consideration of the more notable of the subject classes. It is in

that way the facts first ranged themselves in my mind. In the course of my study, however, I began to notice the striking and amazing similarity of the disciplinary methods exerted over the subject classes. Segregation, a rule of silence or of posture, hair-cutting, dieting, killing, torturing, especially whipping, mutilating, branding or smearing, clothing, breeding, match-making or its preclusion, making work—these are the more conspicuous methods of social rule. To all of the subject classes from period to period or from group to group, they have been applied—to juniors, to women, to slaves and other “workers,” to criminals, to defectives, to the lower animals, to the dead,¹ to gods, and, from an objective point of view, to oneself. It is to be hoped that monographs on these various methods of social rule will some day be written. Such a treatment might carry quite

¹ Even the dead, it is believed, can be killed. In Fiji, for example, if you die a bachelor, your ghost is likely to be slashed into bits. A Fijian tale is current of a chief who had encountered the ghost of an enemy and had killed him for the second and last time. [Mayer, A. G., in *The Scientific Monthly*, I. (1915), 29.] The Herero believe that a maggot which lives, they say, in the spinal cord becomes the ghost of the deceased. To kill the ghost, they fracture the backbone of the corpse. [*Folk-Lore Journal* (of South Africa), I. (1879), 55 ft.]

a far-reaching conviction about the character of social rule. A comparative study of the practice of flagellation, for example, might lead the advocate of corporal punishment to question whether the belief that "the shortest road to a boy's moral sense is through his cuticle"¹ is the main motive in whipping boys; a like study of practices of segregation might suggest to certain moralists that solitary confinement or ghettos or the tenet that woman's place is in the home were more than mere means of safeguarding the law-abiding or the virtuous, of protecting the home or purity of race. Reviewing the forms of compulsory breeding or of restricted feeding might arouse queries as to whether anti-birth control measures had been passed solely for the good of society, or whether a minimum wage is opposed solely because it is believed to endanger economic prosperity. Indeed, not a few social formulas, not a few points of view of accepted morality might find themselves in jeopardy from such studies of the will to power. In this discussion we are engaged, however, I would repeat, neither in controversy nor in propaganda;

¹ Dictum of President Wilson, May 15, 1916.

we are engaged in analysis. And, let me add, with analysis from a single point of view, a view taken frankly and deliberately from one side.

In the course of this analysis I have had to assume some ethnographical information on the part of the reader and that amount of ethnological interest which is indispensable to a liberal education. Although rash, the assumption was necessary. To be enlightening, the sociological point of view of this study must be far reaching; it must include glimpses of many different societies. Although I have tried to hold to a comparative point of view, I have assumed that for the time our interest is concentrated in our own culture, and the discussion proceeds along this line of concentration. The discussion has therefore a social rather than a scientific character.

WOMEN

THE rule of the Elders over the sex life of their juniors, whether it consists in regulating sex impulse or in ignoring it, this rule has ever been drastic, it is today in our own culture far more drastic than we realise. A great part of the history of marriage might be discussed from this point of view. For mating as an institution is planned largely for the benefit of the Elders and in many particulars it is primarily an expression of their will to power. I have little doubt that the Eskimo or Blackfellow parent or group Elder who betroths an infant or an unborn child is personally gratified, as we say, by the betrothal. The more noticeable motive in child betrothal or child marriage may vary—there may be a general desire to provide for offspring, or a kind of impatience to have the prospects of a son or daughter assured, or the betrothal or marriage may bring specific advantages to parents, a bride price or alliance

with another family, but, whatever the superficial or conspicuous motive, the interference on the part of the family Elders is at bottom, we need hardly question, to ensure their control.

In the fact that betrothal or marriage can be controlled more easily the younger the *fiancés* or the marrying, lies, I think, the main explanation of child betrothal and child marriage. But marriage at adolescence or later is still largely determined by parents or senior relatives,—witness the extent of marriage by barter or purchase or service. In these forms of marriage there is one aspect I would emphasise, namely, that the profit accruing to the family marrying off a girl is a subsidiary consideration. The main gratification in marrying her off is the sense of power it gives her seniors, a sense of power over her and over her suitor. It is for this reason primarily a marriageable girl is thought of as an economic asset. As a form of property, as a chattel, she is the more malleable. This aspect of proprietorship in living beings, proprietorship for the sake of malleability, figures in the conjugal relationship itself as well as in franker forms of slavery or of

domestication. With your own you may do what you like.

And one of the things you are apt to like to do, if you are a forceful person, is to make creatures breed, not alone offspring, but animals, slaves, and, shall we say, friends, neighbours, fellow citizens, and sovereigns. Even the gods are required to beget and conceive. To satisfy this breeder's ambition, matchmaking flourishes in endless forms; the young are prepared for marriage¹ as well as married off; their own initiative in mating is harshly suppressed or penalised; celibacy is stigmatised, so are unauthorised child-bearing, unauthorised abortion, barrenness voluntary or involuntary, and the individual control of conception; child-bearing is accounted a moral, a religious, or a patriotic duty. Sometimes the extent of the duty is unrestricted, sometimes it is standardised. "Multiply and replenish the earth" command Jew and Catholic. "To be a worthy citizen, you must have four children at least,"

¹ Consider, for example, the rites of defloration and of circumcision. Whatever other meanings attach to these rites they have also to be regarded as preparatory to mating.

declares Mr. Roosevelt. "If you have three, you will receive land in the Campania," promised Julius Cæsar.

The self-determination in mating or child-bearing which leads to celibacy or unfruitfulness is discouraged, but the group itself reserves a right to decree chastity or barrenness. Sacerdotal chastity may be prescribed or chastity for the dead. A royal personage may be precluded from child-bearing, a male or female deity from sexual intercourse. Contenance may be required of other professional classes, and the age at marriage may be specifically advanced. Dieri Elders, for example, order young men to wait until they have a full beard.¹ The Japanese feudal law of Satsuma forbade under pain of death any sexual relations with women until men were thirty.² American college faculties or trustees sometimes

¹ Howitt, A. W., *The Native Tribes of South-East Australia*, p. 183. London and New York, 1904. The Elders say that young persons marrying would be too much taken up with each other. The Dieri are without the ceremonial adjustment of a honeymoon whereby the early fervour is readily exhausted and the couple rendered sociable again.

² Carpenter, Edw., *Intermediate Types Among Primitive Folk*, p. 150. London, 1914.

forbid, not sexual intercourse, but marriage, under pain of dismissal.

When modern communities have to forego their control over child-bearing through losing the religious or the legal sanction¹ for a high birth rate, it is not at all improbable that they will prove highly arbitrary about sterilizing persons they may consider unfit. There may be a strong impulse to practise vesectomy, for example, against all "undesirable" citizens or against prisoners of war. Eugenics may be called upon to approve of operations upon anarchist women or upon feminists of a particularly obnoxious type.

I return to further consideration of what is as yet the more usual form of social control of propagation, control through marriage, and I would speak more particularly of marriage by service. Marriage by service is a particularly obvious expression of the seniors' desire to "manage." Far more gratifying than the economic service of the prospective son-in-law is his spirit of subservience. How severely it may be tested is well

¹ I refer to church and state pronouncements and laws against contraceptives.

illustrated among the Koryaks and Chukchees of North-Eastern Asia. The Koryak suitor has to serve from six months to three years. During this service his prospective bride is entirely inaccessible to him, intimacy were a sin. The girl may even leave home to live with relatives. Meanwhile her suitor is ill-fed, given a poor bed, not allowed to sleep late, and sent on exhausting errands. As the herdsman of the family he must pass his nights without sleep while the men of the family rest. His endurance, patience, and meekness are tested. In determining his work, the principal idea seems to be not his usefulness, but the hard and humiliating nature of his tasks.¹ The life of the Chukchee suitor is similar. He has to please the girl's father, her elder brothers, and other male members of the family. If one of the old people reproaches him and calls him names, he has to bear it patiently, he

¹ Jochelson, W., *Mem. Amer. Mus. Nat. Hist.*, vol. VI., Pt. II., pp. 735, 740. Leiden and New York, 1908.

Jochelson tells a story of how a Chukchee match-maker won the consent of the girl's father through rendering him a humiliating personal service, much as the gods are placated by acts of self-sacrifice, their pride gratified by manifest subserviency.

To make your subjection patent is a component of "good manners" to all "superiors," to all who have you in any way in their power or whom you would persuade of having power.

is even expected to agree. When the old people are ill-tempered, they may starve him and deny him shelter. This treatment may keep up for months and even after he wins in the struggle to get his girl he is expected to go on serving his father-in-law for two or three years "*as long as his joy in his wife is still fresh.*"¹

From these Siberian instances as well as from instances one might cite from many other parts of the world it would appear that the sex life of men as well as of women is regulated by their elders. This fact has been curiously disregarded. And yet whatever is a restriction upon the sex choices and sex activities of women is almost necessarily a restriction upon men. A high bride-price may keep a young man from marrying, punishments for adultery by women or limitations on their right to divorce in order to remarry may affect men as well as women, affecting men through the women they would mate with. A double code of sex morals is not always as clear-cut a dispensation as moralists suppose. It is only when a class of loose women, literally *loose* women, is recruited

¹ Bogoras, pp. 585-6. The italics are mine.

that men become at all independent of the sex restrictions put upon family-controlled women. Part of the opposition to a man marrying a prostitute is due to the will not to let him escape entirely from that control which the Elders exert through their control of women with family ties. To this end, moreover, the sex life a man leads uncontrolled by the Elders is made just as unpleasant by them as possible. The less gratifying it is, the sooner is a man anxious to enter into a family life, the more he wants to get married, mating in accordance with the views of the Elders and of the women who have accepted those views.

Women accept the views of the Elders on mating and submit to their rule more unreservedly and more docilely than men, a differentiation going far to explain the existence of the so-called double code. Whether the family rule requires continence or incontinence¹ girls usually obey it.

¹ In East Central Africa a girl is told that unless she resorts to the young men's house as soon as she is nubile she will die. [MacDonald, J., in *Journal Anthropological Institute*, XX. (1892-3), 101]; the Natchez told their daughters that only girls who had disported themselves well with the youths would pass easily over the narrow plank leading into the grand villages of the next world. (Swanton, J. R., "Indian Tribes of the Lower Mississippi Valley

Nor from it at marriage is a woman as likely to be set free as a man. Her family keeps its hold over her conjugal affairs. In bride-selling communities, for example, the bride-price is a kind of security for good behaviour on the part of the bride. Were she to merit divorce her price would have to be returned to her husband or his people. In this way a married woman remains accountable to her family. They control her through her bride-price. Even in the absence of a bride-price, their consent to her divorce¹ may be necessary. An Omaha

and Adjacent Coast of the Gulf of Mexico," p. 94, *Bull. 43, Bur. Amer. Ethnol.*)

In Chicago, in the neighbourhood of Hull House, mothers have threatened their daughters that if they went to dance halls or out to walk with strange young men they would give birth to devil-babies to their lasting disgrace. (Addams, Jane, in *The American Journal of Sociology*, July, 1914.) More characteristically American ways of threatening disgrace in order to exact continence of daughters will occur to the reader.

¹ Consent to divorce is not always, as we know, a familial prerogative. It has been usurped by rulers of all kinds, rulers who, however they may differ in other respects, probably get from this divorcing right the same kind of gratification. No doubt the Blackfellow elder who refuses to decree a divorce gets as much satisfaction out of his obduracy as under similar circumstances a New York judge or an English M. P. The dictum that whom God hath put together let no man put asunder must give an analogous sense of power to the god's representative. Even a democracy that professes belief in granting life, liberty, and happiness to all may enjoy too much its control over mating to grant divorce by mutual consent.

girl knew that if she married without her family's approval she would not be able to get their consent to a divorce. "Not so," her kinsmen would retort, "still have him for your husband, remain with him always."¹ Besides when neither law nor custom requires a woman to heed her people in getting a divorce, she may be greatly influenced by them. "My mother says it would kill her if I got a divorce," I once heard a sorely tried New York woman exclaim. "How *can* I?" Eventually in this case the usurping old lady did not have her way.²

¹ Dorsey, J. Owen, "Omaha Sociology," III. (1881-2), 262. *Ann. Rep. Bur. Amer. Ethnol.*

² The way taken by parents to control the sex life of daughters is not always of course to imply that independent action would be murder. The following citation illustrates another very popular method: "There is one occasion on which, perhaps, more than on any other, daughters are apt to act in opposition to parental wishes, which is, when they are about to enter into matrimonial engagements. Is it not reasonable that they who have, with infinite care, and perhaps at the sacrifice of health and strength, nurtured you from infancy, and who have watched over your opening years—is it not just and proper that their wishes should be consulted, and their opinion treated with deference, when the welfare of your whole life is at stake?" (Coxe, Margaret, *The Young Lady's Companion*, p. 231. Columbus, 1846.)

Parental constraint may take still different forms. Among the Todas the father of a married woman after consulting with two Elders may sell her to another man. Neither her consent nor her husband's is required. She is taken away by force. But the

Nor does a woman even without family interference become as she grows older more independent in sex affairs. From the dominion of her family she passes under the dominion of her husband and, perhaps in addition, of his family. Even when she goes on living at home and her husband is serving for her or is more or less subject to her household heads, even so, she is his to rule. She waits on him and "does" for him. Few women are institutionally as independent as Pueblo Indian women and I am thinking more particularly of Zuñi women. Zuñi women marry and divorce more or less at pleasure. They own their houses and their gardens. Their offspring are reckoned of their clan. Their husbands come to live with them in their family group. And yet Zuñi women "look after" their husbands, look after them quite as meekly, I surmise, as a wife after a

Elders may have to be bribed. (Rivers, *The Todas*, p. 525.) A Fjort girl who objects to carrying out the matrimonial design of her parents is brought to a fetich where she is "taken down" a bit by hearing a voice say, "Are you then so beautiful that you can afford to despise this good man on account of his ugliness?" Thereupon her hands are tied and she remains a prisoner until she consents. (Dennett, R. E., *Notes on the Folklore of the Fjort*, p. 97. London, 1898.)

husband among peoples where descent is paternal and the wife, a chattel. I recall a little incident I once saw—an elderly Zuñi coming indoors from threshing and bidding his elderly wife bring him water to wash his hands. Her compliance was not an act of graciousness, it seemed to me, it was the carrying out of an order.¹ She had the habit of doing what her husband told her.

Among us, this devoted wife would no doubt have been described as worth her weight in gold. Such a wife Martin Luther once described in even more glowing terms: "My rib, Kate," he writes, "is obedient and complying with me in all things, and more agreeable, I thank God, than I could have expected; so that I would not change my poverty for the wealth of Croesus."² In all societies wives do in fact perform services that can not be bought. No slave or servant would care for you as well as a wife, and marriage is on the whole the most satis-

¹ Within the year another act of compliance cost this woman her life. She fell ill when she was camping out in the mountains gathering piñon nuts. The women with her quite properly advised warmth and rest but her husband insisted on driving her home; "alive or dead," he would get her home, he said. During the rough and cold drive back she died.

² Child, Maria, *Married Women*, p. 139. New York, 1871.

factory device yet worked out for the control of one adult by another.

Marital rule, like parental rule, displays itself along two main lines. A man *does things* to his wife—he has her cut off her hair or like the Galla, part it,¹ he has her blacken her teeth, he has her wear clothes befitting wedlock, clothes shabby or ornate as opinion goes, she is branded² for him or cut,³ he has her forego ornaments or put them on, he has her live according to his station in life, he *supports* her. In patriarchal and semi-patriarchal cultures he *makes* her the mother of *his children*, in all but the most modern circles of modern culture he may impregnate her at will or

¹ Wakefield, Th., in *Folk-Lore*, XVIII. (1907), 324. A *divorcée* must wear her hair ruffled up again.

² On marriage an Ainu girl's tattoo is completed. "Her tattooed mouth must now speak only for her husband, and her tattooed hands and arms must henceforth work for him alone." (Batchelor, John, *The Ainu and Their Folk-Lore*, pp. 25-6. London, 1901.) Strictly speaking, I suppose premarital improvements like this tattooing by the Ainu or like the foot-binding of the Chinese are a matter of parental rather than marital wilfulness.

³ The Baganda believe that a woman who does not menstruate is a dangerous woman, a woman capable of killing her husband. The husband of such a woman always cuts her slightly with his spear before he goes to war, drawing her blood to ensure his safe return. [Roscoe, J., in *Journal Anthropological Institute*, XXXII. (1902), 39.]

he may keep her continent against her will. If she is nevertheless wilful in this particular, he may beat her or cut off her ears or nose or burn her alive or shoot her with impunity or, like Master Frankford in *A Woman Killed with Kindness*, force her to suicide.

A "spotted strumpet," for her own good Mistress Frankford was shamed before her servants and her children and then driven into exile. In many communities even for less offences a husband will chastise his wife. A certain native of Madura whose young wife was fond of gadding about made her drag about a log chained and padlocked round her leg.¹ This form of discipline is applied in Madura to disobedient school boys and apprentices. Although such correction of the young and of wives is rationalised as being beneficial to them,² it no doubt gratifies the

¹ Thurston, p. 439.

² The doctrine about the moral need of obedience is a conspicuous outcome of such rationalising. The will to power takes on many disguises. To obey for the sake of self, *i.e.* of character is one. To submit for the sake of society, for "the good of society" is another. To obey in order to serve God or to submit to God's will is another. The disguise in this type of submission is sometimes very slim. The *Dabistán* instructs women to go three times a day to their husband and ask his wishes. Women

parent¹ or husband who administers it. Some forms of punishment render this view unquestionable. Take for example the treatment of an unfaithful wife in the Javādi hills of Southern India. "The young men of the tribe are set loose on her," after which she is put in a pit filled with filth.² Rape as a punishment for adultery is a practice elsewhere and it expresses, I take it, the sense of outrage a man feels when his will has been thwarted.³ A wife's refusal to live with him may also be vexatious to a man. Among us all he can do is to bring a suit for the restitution of conjugal rights.

"must never, either by night or day, avert their face from their husband's command: which obedience on their part is serving God." (*The Dabistān*, p. 166. Washington and London.) See too p. 170.

¹ It is only a very modern disciplinarian who keeps assuring his subject that he himself gets no gratification from punishing. "It hurts me more than it hurts you," is the disclaiming formula.

² Thurston, p. 421.

³ Verbal insults to a woman, a kind of verbal raping, are similarly indulged in by men who feel their sex prerogatives have been encroached upon. (*Cp.* Parsons, *The Old-Fashioned Woman*, pp. 289, 291.) The insulting restores to them, as it were, a sense of masculine power. Among other cases I have in mind an exploit of the medical students in the Blockley Almshouse in 1861. Irritated by the trespass of women on their profession, one day, to disconcert the women students, they brought into the lecture room a male patient entirely nude. (Meyer, A. N., *Woman's Work in America*, p. 165. New York, 1891.) The fear of anti-suffragists that women voters would be insulted at the polls must be due to some such conception.

In Southern India in the Coimbatore hills he may see to it that his refractory wife is tied to a tree and the contents of a hornet or wasp nest emptied at her feet. After a few minutes the woman will be asked if she is now willing to live with her husband. In token of assent she has to lick a mark made on his back with fowl's excrement, and say: "You are my husband. In future I shall not quarrel with you, and will obey you."¹

We have been speaking of real wilfulness in a wife, of real rebellion against being *sub potestate viri*. There is a kind of mock wilfulness or waywardness which is required of her, the pleasing kind of sex resistance we call modesty. It is particularly conspicuous during courtship or at marriage. A bride's reluctance or dismay is undoubtedly gratifying to the bridegroom or his people or to the kinsmen who are disposing of a woman.²

¹ Thurston, p. 420.

² Or of a man. There are "rape symbols" in connection with bridegrooms. Not uncommonly marriage propriety consists of imposing humiliations upon the bridegroom, making him feel he does not count for much. The Tavetan bridegroom, for example, has to play the part of a goat-herd. Only little boys or starving beggars serve as goat-herds and a more humiliating job can not be imagined by the Wa Taveta. (Hollis, p. 117.) The dignity of the bridegroom in civilization is not altogether respected.

The more she resists them or resists her bridegroom the more flattering is her final submission or conquest.¹ Hence non-resistance on her part, whether it is thought of in ceremonial terms or otherwise, is immodest, indecent, shameful. Incidentally we may note that refusal which has acceptance in view, *i.e.*, a ceremonial refusal or denial may be gratifying to those making the advances. It enhances the sense of power the ultimate back-down gives them. Hence it is likely to be good manners to decline any offer or "honour" at its first making, even a post of command. It gives those who put you in command over them a sense that after all it is they who put you there. This is the reason, I take it, why at an initiation in Victoria the Blackfellow chosen sponsor vociferously objects at first to accepting, declaring the honour far too great for him,² or why any well-bred Chinaman will accept an appointment to office by first declining it.

¹ The rape symbol is not of eighteenth century culture, but that a courtship was so often described in that period as a *conquest* is a fact belonging to the same complex of ideas or feelings.

² Smyth, R. Brough, *The Aborigines of Victoria*, I., 67. Melbourne and London, 1878.

We have been discussing what a husband does to or for a woman. The other line taken by the marital will to power we have already referred to, it is having a wife do things for you, further your convenience, be considerate of your needs, sexual and material, keep your house, spend your income or add to it, bring up your children, entertain your mates or guests or friends, perform the "social duties" you would evade, and in general look after your "interests." To be a "good" wife a woman must be satisfactory along both these lines, reconciling them discreetly and soberly. She must let her husband do things for her, she must depend upon him, gratifying his sense of chivalry, and she must also be a woman of character, able to represent him in the outside world, able to say with the Roman matron, *Ubi tu Caius ego Caia*, a woman in short you would not be ashamed of, a woman you don't have to leave at home or whom you would not blackball as a member of your club.

That conjugal rule is wholly marital needs hardly be said. A woman may do and often enough does things for or to her husband. She looks after his

health, his sleep, his digestion, his apparel, and she takes care of him in this way, not because he tells her to, but as she would for a child, a kind of mothering which is, I surmise, a satisfaction of her own will to power. It gives her a sense of being needed, she says, of having a place in the world.¹ Even the feeling that a man is working for her, working not because she is part of his equipment—the usual motive in so-called work for women,—but because he is truly her servant, even this feeling of domination I have seen entertained now and then by women.

From the institutional point of view, however, it is women who gratify men's will to power rather than men, women's. There is as yet little or no institutional provision for the bossing of men by women. The henpecked husband is an object of ridicule. So is the husband who so lets his wife escape his control as, in that curious antique phrase, to make him wear horns. According to Hindu precept the man who shows love to a wife who

¹ To keep her place in the world, *i.e.*, to preclude becoming an outcast widow, a Hindu bathes in turmeric water, a matchless specific for longevity in husbands. (Thurston, pp. 366-7.)

constantly contradicts him becomes liable to censure himself.¹ The early German who let his wife strike him was likely to have the roof taken off his house by his critical neighbours. The only proper way to deal with such a wife, they held, was to make her ride backwards on an ass holding on by the tail.² Indeed everywhere the woman who eludes such retaliation, the woman who twists a man around her little finger, even the woman who plays neck to her man's head,³ is only the de-institutionalised woman, the woman who in some way or other has cut loose from familial or conjugal conventions. In Gaina terms she is not a woman at all, but a "female demon."⁴ Even the woman movement we have called feminism has not succeeded by and large in giving women any

¹ *Narada*, XII., 94. *Sacred Books of the East*, XXXIII.

² Goodsell, W., *A History of the Family as a Social and Educational Institution*, p. 196. New York, 1915.

³ This figure of speech I take from the Rev. Eben Galusha of New York, one of the ecclesiastics who objected to the seating of the American women delegates at the Abolitionist Convention held in London in 1840. (*History of Woman Suffrage*, I., 56. New York, 1881.) The Rev. Galusha did not object to the rôle of the neck for women.

⁴ *Uttarādhyayana Sūtra*, VIII., 18. *Sacred Books of the East*, XLV. Such are women "who continually change their mind, who entice men, and then make a sport of them as of slaves."

control over men.¹ It has only changed the distribution of women along the two stated lines of control by men, removing vast numbers of women from the class supported by men to the class working for them.

This redistribution of women may be of course just an incident of feminism. It may be that this movement is primarily not concerned with the control of one sex by the other at all. The main objective of feminism in fact may be defeminisation, the declassification of women as women, the recognition of women as human beings or personalities.

It is not hard to see why the classification of women according to sex has ever been so thorough and so rigid. As long as they are thought of in terms of sex and that sex the weaker or the submissive, they are subject by hypothesis to control. Just as soon as women are considered not as creatures of sex, but as persons, sex regulations

¹ It tends in fact to lessen even those sporadic opportunities for backstair influence so precious to the old-fashioned woman. From the standpoint of success in controlling males the "lady" is more perspicacious than the "new woman." In the lady's social system although backstair influence is hardly institutional it is not the illicit or immoral exploit the feminist would make it.

cease to apply. To preserve the application of sex regulations neither women nor men must forget for a moment that women are women. Their womanliness must never be out of mind—if masculine rule is to be kept intact. To be declassified is very painful to most persons and so the charge of unwomanliness has ever been a kind of whip against the would-be woman rebel. Not until she fully understands how arbitrary it is and how guileful, unwittingly guileful of course, will she cease to fear its crack.

The more thoroughly a woman is classified the more easily is she controlled. The vernacular phrase, a *new woman*, has the psychological significance so curiously attaching to popular phrases. The *new woman* means the woman not yet classified, perhaps not classifiable, the woman *new* not only to men, but to herself. She is bent on finding out for herself, unwilling to live longer at second hand, dissatisfied with expressing her own will to power merely through the ancient media, through children, servants, younger women and uxorious men. She wants to be not only a masterless woman, one no longer classified as daughter

or wife, she wants a share in the mastery men arrogate.

This share has been and will be a sorry bone of contention between men and women. Men will cede to women only what by ceding gives them an assurance of power, like making an allowance to a wife or educating a daughter to citizenship,¹ or they will cede only what they consider has ceased to give mastery—just as they are now ceding the vote or the ecclesiastical profession or the Latin language or parental proprietorship.² And women will continue to find the campaign against sex discrimination or disqualification a more or less satisfactory outlet³ for their energy. And so it

¹ As soon as men realise—and that day seems near—the field open to them not in educating women along the old line classically defined by Rousseau—to render men's lives easy and agreeable—but in educating women to hold men's social standards, some of the foundations of the present feminist movement will be shattered. Dissimilarity between the sexes and not similarity may be the new feminist war cry, feminists taking up the position now held by anti-feminists.

² Or just as German men opened their industrial guilds to women when the factory superseded the guild (Anthony, Katharine, *Feminism in Germany and Scandinavia*, p. 177, New York, 1915), or just as women were allowed to teach in the United States when learning ceased to qualify for political leadership.

³ Not that masterful women will not find other outlets. Women satisfied by other outlets, outlets probably secured as early

will go—at least until a subordination of sex to personality far more sweeping than we dream of today comes to be. Given that subordination, difference of sex will prove a stimulus between personalities and a means of mutual aid. Without such subordination it will be a source of antagonism and strife.

feminist gains, like public speaking or civic work, women thus satisfied may prove the most active anti-feminists. Besides, anti-feminism is itself an outlet for energy. The more vociferous anti-suffragists have been masterful women. Social obscurantism has been known to offer opportunities for the will to power.